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RESOLVING THE TENSIONS BETWEEN MONITORING, RESOURCING AND 
STRATEGIZING: STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY VENTURE 
BOARDS  
 
Abstract 
There are central tensions between the two sides of the board’s institutional role or function: that 
of controlling and monitoring versus that of resource gathering and strategizing. Drawing upon a 
field study lasting 38 months involving 8 new ventures in the UK high technology sector, we took 
a close look at the structural composition, knowledge base and behaviours of the board of directors 
in the early stage high technology ventures. Our findings suggest that the early venture board, 
when consists of part-time members with diverse knowledge background, can be seen as an 
extension of the full time internal top management team. As “collective entrepreneurs”, they play a 
vital role in the venturing process; pointing to a collaborative model between inside top 
management team and outside board directors, which goes beyond the principal-agency model. 
We discuss the wider implications of our work for the field generally.  
 
 
  
Resolving the Tensions between Monitoring, Resourcing and Strategizing: © 2010  4
Resolving the Tensions between Monitoring, Resourcing and Strategizing: Structures and 
Processes in High Technology Venture Boards 
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? 
"Bolt her in, constrain her!" But who can watch the watchmen?” Juvenile: Satires 
Parable of the Talents  
“For it will be like a man going on a journey, who called his servants and entrusted to them his 
property. To one he gave five talents, to another two, to another one, to each according to his 
ability. Then he went away. He who had received the five talents went at once and traded with 
them, and he made five talents more. So also he who had the two talents made two talents more. 
But he who had received the one talent went and dug in the ground and hid his master's money. 
...” Mathew 25:14-30 
 
Introduction 
The literature on boards and their contribution to firm strategy and firm development has 
traditionally focused on the larger public company with a diverse set of shareholders, and explored 
in detail how boards can act as monitors as well as builders of value. More recently there has been 
a theoretical and empirical augmentation by extending the literature to the study of smaller, often 
private companies with typically a more limited number of outside shareholders. This newer 
literature has noted that the role of the board may differ with a greater emphasis placed on 
establishing legitimacy and in assisting the firm in overcoming the liability of newness and small 
scale, yet retaining the monitoring role1. 
However, as Stiles (2001:631) points out, in this newer literature there is a paucity of 
evidence, particularly of board processes, and as a result much theorising has taken place without 
building on carefully grounded observation. And as Pettigrew notes, to understand the nature of 
board in operation, we need to pay greater attention to behaviour dynamics in and around 
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boardroom2.  This paper seeks to fill that gap. Here we report the study of some 8 firms that are in 
an early stage of development, sometimes labelled entrepreneurial “threshold” firms as they are 
beyond start up but before maturity3.  In particular, we adopt an approach of direct observation, 
interview and examination of relevant documents, a process that has uncovered dimensions others 
may have missed, or misunderstood. 
Our process work shows both support and contradictions with this newly emerging 
literature. We certainly find support for the propositions that the board can add significant value in 
the early stage high-technology ventures (entrepreneurial “threshold” firm) by performing value-
adding services, in particular gathering resources and providing strategic advice4. But, our research 
raises questions about how this value is created. In particular, our work suggests that an active 
board in a young firm, when it consists of a majority of part-time members, seems at first sight to 
be structured in a manner that signals an institutional role of independence. But, in practice the 
board does not seem to operate separately from top management, but rather as an extension of the 
top-management team. This observation draws attention to the potential incompatibility of the 
institutional role of control/monitoring on the one hand and resourcing and strategizing on the 
other.  
As we will explain, if the board is an extension of the top management team, then we need 
to adjust our theorising and our understanding of practice. For instance, when thinking about these 
entrepreneurial “threshold” firms, we should be cautious in applying concepts such as of 
“absorptive capacity” and “strategy making” differentially to the board and the management of the 
company5. Indeed, our work suggests that in many instances shareholders seem to choose a 
talented independent board but charges them with adding value; it seems that the shareholders 
deliberately place less emphasis on the board’s role as monitors concerned with “guarding the 
money”..  That is why the heading to this paper contests Juvenal’s concern of “Quis custodiet 
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ipsos custodes?” by the words of Mathew in the Bible who reminds us that scarce resources (good 
board members) are there to be put to work.  
We begin our paper by reminding the reader of the extant and recent literature; highlighting 
areas where we see tensions to be uncovered in a process study. We then explain our sample, data 
collection and methods by which we metric events. We describe in some detail the actions of our 
sample of directors, indicating that this activity is not widely appreciated or understood, that leads 
us to the discussion section where we explain and confront prior theorising with our observations, 
and why we conclude that notions of strategy making, resource acquisition, and board 
accountability need to be reshaped to recognise some fundamental inconsistencies in prior 
thinking.  
 
Literature review and research questions 
To achieve the twin objectives of corporate governance, wealth protection and wealth creation, the 
extant board literature has identified three main functions or roles for the board—
control/monitoring, resource gathering and strategizing6.  
First there is the corporate governance literature that has traditionally emphasized the 
board’s primary function as controlling and monitoring managers on behalf of shareholders. 
Originated from Berle and Means’ seminal work on the separation between ownership and control, 
agency theorists have emphasised that, the agency costs may arise due to the misappropriation of 
firm resources by managers (“agents”) due to their different interests from those of owners 
(“principals”).  To reduce such agency costs, an “independent” board of directors is put in place to 
monitor and control the managers of the company in general and the CEO in particular7.  
Independence in this context usually refers to a balance of executive and non-executive directors 
(NEDs), and the separation of Chairman and CEO, and it is believed that such structural 
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compositions brings objectivity and detachment from daily operations to permit members to see 
things differently and exercise independent judgement8.   
On the other hand, resource dependence and institutional theorists depict the board as a 
mechanism that uses external ties and linkages to secure critical resources such as including 
advice, legitimacy, access to support from outside the firm and so on.  As such, this stream puts 
much emphasis on direct and indirect social ties9. In addition to this resourcing role, management 
scholars and policy makers have paid increasing attention to boards of directors’ direct 
contribution to strategizing.   Drawing upon cognition and decision-making theory, scholars in this 
stream have argued that to be effective in shaping strategy, the board needs to have functional 
expertise as well as appropriate broad strategic knowledge base10.  
In the entrepreneurial context most would expect the resource and strategizing role of the 
board to be important. Growing successful high tech ventures demands accessing and acquiring a 
wide array of managerial skills and expertise within a short span of time.  Original founders rarely 
have the full range of skills required to make the business a success: many are scientists with little 
serious commercial experience, and even in those cases where the CEOs are not scientists, they 
rarely have the necessary science and technology knowledge critical to make the business a 
success.  In addition, young ventures can rarely afford to buy in the knowledge and skills through 
recruiting full time professional managers. Prior work noted above suggests that part-time non-
executive board members, consisting professional advisors and venture capitalists, may be more 
experienced and knowledgeable than the full time executive team. Therefore, it is important to ask 
whether the board has a knowledge base that is effective for monitoring, i.e. board’s knowledge on 
ratifying and monitoring management decision, e.g. to hire and fire top managers, and set 
compensation for top managers11; or whether it is more geared towards promoting resource and 
strategy role, i.e. “deep knowledge” of issues that are closely relevant to the “threshold firm”? Of 
Resolving the Tensions between Monitoring, Resourcing and Strategizing: © 2010  8
course, it is possible that the knowledge base of the directors would extend in both directions, but 
this would suggest a rather narrow set of possible directors. Therefore, in our work, we ask: 
RQ1: Does the structure and knowledge composition of the early venture board promote 
the role and function of monitoring, or does it favour resourcing and strategizing, or 
does it promote both?  
 
As Forbes and Milliken point out, sometimes the board is capable of performing all of the possible 
institutional roles, but does not actually behave in the manner expected12. In our particular case, it 
can be because there is a paradoxical tension between the two sides of board’s function: that of 
control/monitoring versus that of resource gathering and strategizing, arising from divergent 
assumptions of human nature and company needs.  On one hand, the underlying assumption of the 
principal-agent model is individual opportunism, extrinsic motivation and a distrusting owner-
manager relationship; hence, board’s control role or function calls for discipline. On the other 
hand, board’s resource and strategy function calls for a board-management collaboration model, 
which assumes collectivist tendencies, intrinsic motivations, and trusting owner-manager 
relationship. While scholars have proposed a simultaneous need for control and collaboration, 
there is little empirical evidence on how boards may solve this tension13. 
To understand how the tension is resolved, we need to observe the behaviour of the board 
and its members. While the monitoring function calls for a balance of insider and outsiders on 
board; being an outsider does not necessarily imply being independent. Similarly, the presence of 
expertise does not equate to the usage of them14. Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) have shown 
that, to keep their independence and enforce monitoring function, corporate board members 
engage with the executive team but without seeking to assume an executive role, i.e. stay 
“detached” from firm’s daily operation. At the same time, others have argued that, to create value 
for the firm, the board need to actively involved in the resource gathering and strategizing process.  
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For example, much stress is placed on the social networks and the capacity of boards to facilitate 
the access and acquisition of resources through their social ties15. And although the discussion in 
the resource dependency and social network literature tends to emphasise the presence of such 
resources, rather than the use of them, the implication of the theorizing is that boards should be 
active in finding and capturing resources. In a similar vein, strategy scholars have suggested that 
the board needs to be actively engaged with management in the whole strategic decision making 
process16. So the key question remains, does the board appear to resolve the tensions between 
monitoring and resource and strategy function?   So, we ask, 
RQ2:  Is the early venture board’s behaviour consistent with their monitoring, resource and 
strategy role and function?    
 
Context, Data and Methods  
To explore our research questions, we took a close look at the board of director’s 
involvement in 8 early stage high tech ventures in the UK from the initial idea generation to 
forming a fuller scaled business.  As shown in Table 1, all our sample firms were in the high-tech 
sectors—life science, medical devices, diagnostics and software engineering; and they adopted a 
variety of business models.  All of them were incorporated between 2001 and 2005 with the 
exception of AUV, which was incorporated in 1996; and the pre-founding stage of most of them 
can be traced back before 2000.  2 companies in our sample do not involve academic founders. By 
December 2006, 2 companies (ID and PHY) went public, 1 company (AUV) was acquired by a 
listed company, and all other 5 companies were active.  Whilst all our sample firms seemed 
variably successful by the end of the data collection period in the sense that they had not failed, 
their success was not always proven17.  In 2009, one of them (ID) had been liquidated in 2008 but 
restarted with the same technology following a small IPO, another was dormant, and the rest 
varied in the degree of “liveliness”.  We deliberately did not sample ventures funded by “full 
service venture capital firms”, i.e. those who provide continuous funding along with management 
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expertise. As noted earlier, there are few full-service VCs existing in the UK, and they back very 
few ventures. We also note that our sample is biased (deliberately) towards life science sector, 
where new ventures face the extremely demanding task of gathering the necessary knowledge and 
funding, as this was the focus of our questioning. There is much recent literature that talks about 
these challenges in the UK context18. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We followed the sample firms over a 38 month period from October 2003 to December 2006.  
Such a real time data collection approach has been suggested as promising as it maximizes the 
probability of discovering short-lived factors that exert important influence and is unlikely to 
bias researchers before the ultimate outcomes become apparent19. To explore our research 
questions, we examine board’s structure, knowledge composition and their behaviour 
systematically across all cases. We track changes in board’s structure over time.  To identify the 
knowledge structure of the board and its composition, we collected detailed curriculum vitae 
and interviewed board members about their background. With regard to the issue of the early 
venture board’s behaviour and how they performed monitoring, resourcing and strategizing 
roles, we conducted repeated interviews with key informants as well as repeatedly attended 
board meetings and client meeting of some of our sample firms during this period.  Please see 
appendix 1 for more details on methods, data collection and analytical procedures.   
Findings 
We do not pretend that all UK high-tech firms have boards that are structured like the ones we 
studied, but we do claim that our sample is characteristic of many ambitious UK high-tech 
ventures (as evidenced by many informal conversations with directors of other companies held at 
conferences we have organised). For our firms, we found that the boards were structured in a 
manner to encourage “independent monitoring”. But paradoxically they deliberately chose not to 
follow this institutional role; rather the board saw themselves as an extension of management, 
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responsible for building successful ventures. That the board is capable of acting independently is 
made clear by our analysis of the board structure and knowledge composition. That the board 
actually does not take on this role, but instead gets involved in the business of running the firm is 
clear from our process analysis, i.e. the commitment of the board of directors to roles of providing 
managerial skills and expertise, fund raising and designing business model. But this does not mean 
that the boards did not engage in monitoring activity in the same way that all senior managers are 
concerned with monitoring, rather we found that the board’s position was not one of 
“independence” and so “institutionally” their role was not that of being monitors.  
 
1. Our sample of high-tech early ventures had a large “outsider” dominated board with 
diversified knowledge background 
We delay the analysis of how boards operate for a few pages on purpose, to show the unusual 
structure and knowledge base of our boards that contain many very sophisticated professional 
advisors. These structures lend themselves to our boards being very well qualified to 
independently monitor management; quite unlike the typical board of say a small family private 
firm that is not involved in high-technology. This examination of the structure of the boards is 
necessary to build a proper appreciation of the importance of our findings about board behaviour.   
First we show how our sample of early stage ventures had large size working boards.  We 
note that our focus of observation is the working board that includes some who are not legal board 
members at the time. We term these individuals as “informal” board members---they are often 
present at board meetings and involved in the decision making process and they typically include: 
1) past and prospective legal directors, i.e. some people may stay on board when they are no 
longer serve as legal board of directors, or they may start to participate in the venturing process 
before they become legal directors; 2) key professional advisors such as solicitor, accountant, 
scientist, financial PR, management consultant and etc, whose expertise are instrumental at certain 
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stage of the venturing process; 3) board members from its company subsidiaries after they have 
gone public (PHY and ID); or from its holding company after it was acquired (AUV); 4) 
representatives of institutional shareholders such as representatives from government funding 
agencies and university as well as major individual shareholders, not necessarily appointed as legal 
board members.  
Triangulated from both primary and secondary data sources, we coded the legal and 
“informal” board members of each company year by year from incorporation to Dec 2006. As 
shown in table 2, there is a significant portion of “informal” board members involved in the early 
stage venturing process. And an early venture’s working board size at any given year from 
founding varies, whilst the largest size could reach 12 in the case of PHY, all of them have a 
working board size larger than 3. On average the board size increases as firm grows20. The average 
size of the working board of our sample companies is 7.25 (s.d. 1.67) with a range from 5 to 10.  
 We also examine two key aspects of board structural characteristics as mentioned in the 
literature review, i.e. the proportion of outsider or non-executive directors on board; and the 
separation of Chairman and CEO.  As mentioned earlier, there is a significant portion of 
“informal” board members, who are outsiders. And typically the only insider on the legal board is 
the founder/CEO, and the duality of CEO and Chairman is very rare among our sample. Although 
from time to time, board members may act as interim CEO, CFO and executive chairperson when 
there is a crisis such as shortage of funding, or sudden departure of key members of the 
management team. In another word, our data suggests that these early venture boards tend to be 
dominated by outsiders, a structure that fosters monitoring in the traditional sense. However, being 
an outsider does not necessarily equate to “independence”; we need to pay attention to their 
behaviour as explored later.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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Our data also shows that most directors have experience of directorships of other firms, something 
that is consistent with them being monitors. We examine this issue carefully using the total 
directorship per director as a proxy for board’s level of knowledge on monitoring, including both 
their current and past directorship. We include all the current and past board directors from 
founding to December 2006 as a proxy for a working board since they account for the majority of 
the working board members according to our observations. As shown in table 3, the average 
number is 24.35 with a range from 15.5 to 33.8. That is, each director has involved in more than 
24 outside firms on average. This indicates a substantial level of experience for early venture 
board; indeed it is much higher than that found in many IPOs and corporate boards. For instance, 
in a study of 251 UK “IPO company” boards (with an average firm age of 5.4 years and s.d. 
13.83), Filatotchev and Bishop report that the average number of outside directorship per non 
executive directors (NED) is 8.42 (s.d. 6.82); while on average NED jointly have almost 18 
directorships (s.d. 16.92). 
If the board was present to undertake guidance and resource gathering, one would expect 
directors to have “deep knowledge” of issues that are closely relevant to the “threshold firm”, and 
we find this also to be the case. To gauge such “deep knowledge”, we took a close look at each 
member’s prior experience, and we coded their specialist expertise into two types---functional and 
entrepreneurial knowledge. According to Collins and Evans, human expertise can be generally 
categorized into two levels—ubiquitous and specialist expertise.  
Ubiquitous expertise …involves learning or reading rather than immersion in the culture 
of those who have the knowledge, `enculturation' is the only way to master an (specialist) 
expertise which is deeply tacit knowledge-laden because it is only through common 
practice with others that the rules that cannot be written down can come to be 
understood21 (2007:24).  
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This echoes our key informants’ view that, although many board members have ubiquitous 
knowledge across the function domains, they typically contribute their specialist expertise in one 
primary knowledge domain.  We code functional knowledge, which often co-incident with 
industry knowledge, into three types of primary specialist knowledge domain—technology 
development, business development, and corporate finance. We refer entrepreneurial knowledge to 
an in-depth understanding of the process of setting up and building a venture from scratch, e.g. 
when to integrate what kind of knowledge and how. We only code those individuals who had been 
involved in successfully setting up more than one venture before joining the start-up in question as 
having entrepreneurial knowledge, i.e. they were either successful serial entrepreneurs or having a 
wealth of experience of helping young firms to grow. 
As shown in table 3, on average there are about 2 directors in technology development, 
business development and corporate finance knowledge domains, whereas 1 director contributes to 
entrepreneurial knowledge (PHY is an exception).  This indicates that building successful high-
tech high growth ventures requires a diversified array of knowledge. What is not shown in the 
table is the level of expertise that individual board members have. For those who hold 
entrepreneurial knowledge, they are typically successful serial entrepreneurs themselves, or had 
helped to build more than 3 start-ups. Some individuals had been involved in more than 50 start-
ups. For those who hold technological, business and finance expertise, many of them used to hold 
senior positions in large corporations, or partner positions in renowned professional services firms. 
Typically, they have more than 20 years professional working experience in their respected field, 
covering a wide spectrum of specialized expertise such as clinical research and development, 
marketing and sales, business development, legal advice, corporate finance and so on.  
In summary, the structure of the knowledge of the board of directors that we observed and 
the extent of their outside involvement is consistent with BOTH the view that the board members 
could be monitors and the view that they could be builders of value. We stress that we make no 
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claim that all UK high-technology firms have boards like those we studied, but we pay particular 
attention to the issue of structure and knowledge composition because we believe it does represent 
the practices of a group of firms that are interesting and have hitherto not been fully documented. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
2. Process Revealed: How our sample of early stage high-tech venture boards helped young 
firms to access managerial expertise and funding 
While Tables 2 and 3 indicate the potential pool of knowledge that these new ventures can access, 
the presence of knowledge does not equate to the usage of them. We therefore explored whether 
the early venture board’s behaviour is consistent with their monitoring, resource and strategy 
function.    
Our observations confirm that boards provide access to managerial skills and expertise 
both directly and indirectly. For instance, we note boards appear to use their webs of social 
contacts to validate or search information and expert knowledge when needed, including 
identifying target market customer needs, potential partners and so on. Boards also help to identify 
and recruit management talents. They may know someone personally who fits the criteria through 
their prior working experience, or they have used a particular head-hunter who has proved to be 
efficient in finding a particular type of talents for early stage ventures. In addition, they also help 
to screen and interview candidates.  We also note, from time to time, board members may plug in 
knowledge gap directly by acting as interim CEO, CFO, and executive chairperson.  In another 
words, early venture boards may complement as well as substitute internal top management teams.  
Further, we observed that these young ventures have frequent, often monthly formal board 
meetings where members read the meeting agenda and documents beforehand; and digest and 
correct board minutes afterwards. At the same time, informal meetings among board members 
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(daily or weekly) are also common. It is this intensive interaction among a tightly connected group 
that supplies a repertoire of managerial skills and knowledge to the young ventures.  
One particular area of resource gathering dominated the agenda of all of our boards, and 
that was fund raising. We found our early venture boards to be heavily involved in fundraising 
both strategically and operationally. To explore the role of board in fundraising, we gauge the 
amount of time and efforts each venture board spent on fundraising during our observation period, 
drawing upon our observations and field notes initially. We then conducted follow-up interviews 
with key members of the board to confirm our estimations.  As confirmed by key actors, the 
amount of time and effort involved from incorporation to achieving the first round major 
commercial funding increases rather diminishes as funding size increases; management time and 
expenditures occurred during consistent.  
 
As shown in table 4, inside the boardroom, a significant amount of time (41-64% on average) was 
spent on formulating fundraising strategy and related issues. Our findings echo the view that the 
fragmented vertical funding market structures in the UK presents a formidable challenge for early 
stage high tech ventures.  And boards play a key role in devising a viable fundraising strategy, i.e. 
identifying initial funders, subsequent routes of funding and exit strategy for existing investors, as 
well as adapting to the funding environment as required. Without a carefully designed “funding 
map” to orchestrate the funding process as the venture evolves, fundraising tends to be costly. 
Multiple rounds of fund raising tend to increase the direct funding cost such as the advisory fees 
and in-direct costs of pitching and negotiating with potential funds providers. Also additional cost 
may occur when these ventures encounter liquidity problems.  Another key strategic issue is to 
determine when to raise funds, how much to raise and at what valuation. Raising enough funds at 
each round at an appropriate valuation requires an accurate projection of future cash outflow 
before reaching the inflection point. Often for high tech ventures, meeting each milestone tends to 
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inflate company valuation. Hence, timing is key; raising funds shortly before meeting a critical 
milestone tends to leave money on the table. Our research indicates that boards are crucial in the 
decision making process.   
 
Outside the boardroom, a high proportion of board directors (38-63% on average) are directly 
involved in fundraising; and on average, these directors spent 38-61% of their time on fundraising. 
Typical activities include: 
1) Seeking and validating funding related information. It is vital to identify and update 
information about the potential fund providers at different venture development phases and their 
funding criteria. For instance, government backed funding schemes are often lifelines at idea 
generation and proof of concept stage in the UK. And it is reported that there are more than 100 
different kinds of “hybrid” funding schemes in the UK.  Each of them varies in its vintage, funding 
criteria, the amount invested and the way of funding is structured22.  While often a great deal of the 
information is available in the public domain, an in-depth understanding of how funding agencies 
work requires more than desk research. We note that many board members sit on the advisory 
board of various funding schemes.  
2) Reaching and persuading potential investors. In the UK, as the funding range of 
government initiatives is typically between GBP 20K and 250k23, “informal” venture capital funds 
from business angel (BA) and high net worth individuals (HNIs) plays significant role in plugging 
in this equity gap for early stage ventures. In our research, we note that, while on average BA and 
HNIs typically invest under £100,000 per deal individually, there are individuals who invest up to 
£0.5 million per deal. To connect and persuade these investors is not a trivial task. BA/HNI 
network, where they share information, knowledge and may jointly invest in a deal, tends to be 
local and rather enclosed (e.g. Cambridge, London, Scotland angel networks). We note that board 
members connect to this community either through a direct membership (i.e. many of them are 
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active BA themselves), or through personal ties with the gatekeepers—often local accountancy, 
tax or legal advisors who provide services to BA or HNIs on their personal matters.  
Yet, being aware of an investment opportunity is a different matter from making an 
investment decision. While most government funding are provided in the form of grants, BAs and 
HNIs who invest in early stage ventures seek risk adjusted financial returns. Apart from skills, 
persuasion also needs to tailor to individual investment flavor.  Some investors may have a special 
interest for a specific type of technology, or a specific type of technological application area; 
others may view early stage ventures as an alternative investment asset class which enjoys tax 
breaks in the UK. We also note that many individual investors have strong faith in a particular 
board member such that they tend to invest in the companies that he or she is involved repeatedly.  
This seems to suggest that these investors are betting on the board. Further, we note that very often 
board members also plug in the equity gaps themselves when needed.  
3) Coaching and assisting members of the internal top management team to pitch to 
potential funders. The perception of the internal top management team’s ability to articulate the 
strategic plan convincingly in front of potential investors is key in successful fundraising. We 
noted that a lot of effort and time went into coaching. Some board members may spend a whole 
afternoon going through presentations, some may travel with the internal management and attend 
presentations to boost the internal top management team’s confidence and enhance the perceptions 
of potential resource providers as it signals board commitment to the venture. After meetings, 
feedback and skill training would be given. 
 
Furthermore, board cohesiveness is critical to successful fundraising. As shown in table 4, out of 
the 4 life science businesses, three of them are low in board cohesion. In the case of AOX, 
although the board has spent a lot of time discussing fundraising inside boardroom, there is little 
action taken outside boardroom. In the case of AUV and PHY, the success rate is still low despite 
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a significant amount of time and effort spent inside and outside boardroom. Only NOVA exhibits a 
high level of cohesiveness. Generally speaking, we observe that board cohesiveness is manifested 
in following ways:  
1) In the case of high level of cohesiveness, board members recognize and respect each 
other’s expertise area.  This tends to reflect good match between expertise and task delegation. 
This tends to reduce cognitive conflicts, and ease the decision making process as more 
knowledgeable member’s opinion will have more influence on the actual outcome; and board will 
have more influence on internal top management team. In low cohesiveness, the opposite tends to 
happen. For instance, one board member of PHY comments, “Although the business has good 
potential, there is a total lack of focus in strategy. The management team was looking for funding 
sources and potential drug candidates as the CEO and some key executives see fit; they don’t 
listen to the board”.  
 2) There is extensive communication within the group both formally and informally. We 
observe many board members often socialize outside boardroom, and informal discussion takes 
place frequently. One key issue in causing communication difficulties is jargons and language 
used in different knowledge domain. In many cases, we observe effective board tends to use 
layman’s language in discussion to ensure everyone is involved. Any reference to professional 
jargon is explained clearly.  
3) Board members seem to have good faith and trust in each other, and highly motivated 
when cohesive is high.   For instance, the NOVA board member showed strong faith in both the 
business idea and company management. When the company’s future is most uncertain due to 
unfavorable capital market, board members plug in their funds to close the equity gap. In contrast, 
we observe that board members of PHY are less motivated in raising funds for the company.  
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This is in consistent with the board research drawing upon cognition and group dynamics 
literature. Research has suggested that whilst the increase in board size and diversity promotes 
creativity and cognitive capacity to solve complex and unpredictable problems that firms may 
face, it may also create “collective action” problems such as “free riders”, cognitive conflicts and 
in-fighting. This may lead to low level of cohesiveness, which in turn moderates the relationship 
between board resources and effectiveness24. Our data provide empirical evidence to support this 
view.  
Another factor influencing fundraising outcome is the nature of business, as indicated by 
the last column in table 4, initial target market.  Ventures involved in toolkits, diagnostic and 
software engineering business (ID, AIR, CYTO, BLUE) have low capital needs and it is easier to 
raise money for these companies. In the case of BLUE, the main cost is the salary of one 
researcher who is partially funded by a University.  At the same time, investors are more likely to 
invest in those prototypes that they are able to “touch and feel”. In contrast, raising funds for life 
science ventures are more difficult.  Not only because they require a significant amount of funding, 
but also involves expertise to envision the prospects of the business which is highly intangible.  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
3. Early venture board as architect of business model design 
The key strategic issue in early stage venturing process is business model design. High-technology 
ventures often start with a new scientific or technological idea, and it requires a good business 
model to turn an idea into a sustainable business. According to Teece, business model design 
involves determining (1) the benefit the enterprise will deliver to the customer; 2) the technologies 
and features that are to be embedded in the product and service; 3) the identity of market segments 
to be targeted; (4) how the revenue and cost structure of a business is to be ‘designed’ (or if 
necessary ‘redesigned’) to meet customer needs; (5) the way in which technologies are to be 
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assembled and offered to the customer; and (6) the mechanisms and manner by which value is to 
be captured. The first three points reflects how to create value whereas the latter three points 
reflect how to capture value. Moreover, business model design needs to morph over time; and this 
is likely to involve iterative processes25.  
To explore the issue of board’s involvement in strategy, we took a close look at whether 
business model design change at each company from its incorporation to December 2006; and, if 
so, how changes take place.  Following the existing literature on business model, we code the 
change of business model design along two dimensions—value creation and value capturing 
features. As shown in table 5, we note that all firms’ business model design has been modified to 
some extent. And these changes were typically occurred in the boardroom, i.e. key issues 
regarding the business model were typically brought up, debated, decided and revised during board 
meetings. We explore each box in turn.  
 
Along the dimension of value creation, a high degree of change implies that board may refine or 
re-define the initial and final target market, and hence re-design the sequence of product pipelines 
to reach the final target market. It is key to identify and distinguish first customers from scaling 
customers. Not only because these customers have different needs, but also early stage ventures 
rarely have the required resources and capacity to fulfil scaling customer needs initially. (In 
contrast, a low degree of change implies that board may only modify the sequence of product 
pipelines within the initial design of the target market, such as cases of AIR, AUV, AOX and 
CYTO.) 
In the case of NOVA, the scientific founder was an immunologist by training with over a 
decade's experience in the field of natural antimicrobials. The venture was incorporated in 2004 
aiming to commercialise the scientific founder’s breakthrough idea of an innovative anti-infective 
platform technology which prohibits the development of acquired or transmitted pathogen 
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resistance as often occurred in conventional anti-infection treatment. The initial business plan was 
to target the market of antifungal and antibacterial therapeutics. The initial funding application was 
denied by a funding agency on the basis that the business model was “too ambitious”. Before long, 
the start-up was joined by an experienced Chairman with extensive expertise in the commercial 
life sciences arena. Subsequently, the board was restructured with added expertise in the corporate 
finance and life science areas. The board suggested breaking down the overall target market into a 
number of more specific target markets. They identified the fungus nail infection treatment as an 
initial target market, and designed the sequence of product pipeline within the original broad target 
market of antifungal and antibacterial therapeutics. Over time the product pipeline would grow to 
include compounds targeting areas such as systemic fungal infections, respiratory infections, 
acne/dermal infections and etc.  
While the board may play a critical role in streamlining the sequence of product pipeline 
just as in the case of NOVA, they may also refine the business model to broaden the product 
scope. For instance, in the case of ID, the company’s first application was for the detection and 
monitoring of dental caries (tooth decay) based on their proprietary technology (ACIST).  As the 
firm grew, the board helped to shape the strategy by broadening their product scope of a medium 
term plan to develop additional applications for the clinical ACIST technology in the area of caries 
management, including 3D imaging. In the longer term, the board also planned to develop further 
its clinical ACIST technology platform to address other applications such as lesion detection and 
imaging in oncology.  
 We also observe that some boards may change their target market frequently during the 
business model design process. In the case of PHY, their business model design was based on 
identifying target markets and drug candidates from proven Chinese botanical drug treatments 
which meet unmet medical needs in the West; as well as undertaking the purification, 
characterisation, clinical trials and formulation required to make them acceptable to regulatory 
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authorities in the West. And we observed that the company’s strategy frequently shifted among 
various identified target markets of their drug candidates including liver disease, obesity, Hepatitis 
C, Oncology, Respiratory infections and antibiotic resistance.  
In other cases, the board may also abandon the initial target market and re-focus. For 
instance, in the case of BLUE, the company was founded to commercialise a novel data mining 
technology. The initial target market aimed at the financial investment sector; and the board helped 
to introduce the initial user, a large financial institution in the City of London. However, it has 
proven to be difficult to break into this specific market. Hence, the board searched for other 
potential opportunities for commercialising the technology, from the bioinformatics area to the on-
line data analysis areas, such as textual, web data such as blogs and discussion threads, condition 
monitoring.  
 
Along the dimension of value capturing, a high degree of change implies designing (as some of 
them have no clear revenue model initially) or re-designing the revenue model and related 
features. In the case of NOVA, we note that as the board streamlined the sequence of target 
markets, it also helped to specify the revenue model, i.e. to take its lead compound through Phase 
IIa trial before seeking an application–specific licence agreement and strategic alliance with a 
suitable pharmaceutical partner. Whereas in the case of AUV, while the initial revenue model 
design was the same as above, the execution was so poor that the company essentially became a 
contract research organization. When a new Chairman joined the board in 2004, the strategy was 
re-focused to becoming a drug development company. In order to achieve that, the board decided 
to merge with a listed company in order to obtain sufficient funding to take its lead compound 
through Phase IIa trial in the area of Oncology and the deal was successfully executed in 2005.  
 In the case of PHY, although it followed similar revenue model as that of NOVA, we note 
that the partnering strategy was again changed frequently. The rationale behind the business model 
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design was that, by identifying drug candidates from proven Chinese botanical drug treatments, 
they would be able to shorten the R&D process that it takes to develop new drugs from 12-15 
years, to 5-7 years. As a result, it would significantly reduce development costs and produce an 
earlier financial return. Hence, their business model hinges on finding the right partners in both the 
West and Far East. Yet, it seems that they lack focus. We note that, at many board meetings, new 
names of potential collaborators were frequently suggested by the CEO and other executive team 
members. It often resulted in heated debate within the boardroom as some board members strongly 
opposed the lack of focus in their partnering strategy.  This is also reflected in table 4, where the 
success rate of fundraising is rather low in the case of PHY whilst the great amount of time and 
effort were consumed. In the case of BLUE, as the target market shifted from financial sector to 
on-line data analysis areas, the board redesigned the revenue model from tailor-made consulting 
business to providing services to SMEs and other individuals such as students, sole traders and etc.  
 A low degree of change implies that the board helps to refine certain features of revenue 
model as well as searching and identifying potential collaborators including initial users, partners 
for research development, licensing, marketing, distribution and sales.  For instance, in the case of 
ID, the board modified certain features of the “razor and blade” revenue model (i.e. commercialise 
the system through one-off sales of the base station and recurrent sales of the disposable sensors 
and software upgrades), such as the price range. The board also helped to refine the distribution 
strategy from partnering with one global distributor to using multiple local distributors in order to 
diversify risk. AIR, AOX and CYTO share similar features in this regard.  We summarize the 
change in business model in table 6.  
INSERT TABLES 5 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLES 6 ABOUT HERE 
This finding suggests that, all strategic decisions involved in designing a good business model 
require in-depth knowledge about market, technology, finance as well as the linkage among them. 
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As original founders rarely have the range and depth of necessary knowledge, the early venture 
board together with the internal top management team often acts together as the architects of 
business model design.  This is in sharp contrast with established firms, where TMTs typically are 
professional managers with a wealth of experience and in-depth knowledge about the daily 
management issues of the organisation; and thus more likely to initiate the substantive content of 
strategy and implementing strategic changes.  
 
Discussion and contributions 
We started the paper by highlighting the tensions between the two sides of the board’s functions: 
that of controlling and monitoring versus that of resourcing and strategizing in the context of 
entrepreneurial “threshold” firms. To explore this issue, we examined early venture board’s 
structural composition, knowledge base and whether their behaviours are consistent with their 
functions. Our approach differs from previous work on boards in two ways: we looked closely at 
early venture boards; and we conducted our work not at one remove from the boardroom (such as 
by questionnaire), but by direct observation, interview and examination of relevant documents, a 
process that has uncovered dimensions others have been missed, or misunderstood26.  
 
Our findings suggest that when the early venture board consists of a majority of part-time 
members with diverse knowledge backgrounds, it can be seen as an extension of the full time 
internal top management team. As “collective entrepreneurs”, they play a vital role in the early 
venturing process in a collaborative mode that beyond the traditional principal-agent mode27.  This 
finding supports the propositions that the board can add significant value in the early high-
technology venture firms or threshold firms by gathering resources and providing strategic 
advices28. At the same time, our research raises questions about how this value is created.  
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Our companies were unusual, because the boards were carefully structured so as to appear 
to be capable of acting “independently” because they had an unusually large number of 
independent highly qualified outsiders. Yet, despite this seemingly favourable structure we show 
that the early venture board cannot remain “independent” whilst performing resource and strategy 
role effectively. Early venture boards are not monitoring in the traditional sense. They are not 
detached from the firm’s operations; quite the opposite, they are typically actively engaged in 
venture’s resource gathering and strategizing activities.  
Secondly, our early venture board did appear to add considerable value to these young 
firms by their use of knowledge and social networks in various ways exploiting both the depth and 
breadth of their personal knowledge and of their networks. One particular area where the board 
plays a key role is in obtaining finance. Most studies of high technology ventures look at those 
funded by the US styled full service VCs, few look at other firms and fewer still study board 
behaviors of European and UK firms. Our work shows that at least in the UK, boards may spend 
more than 50% of their time in the board room strategizing about fund raising and more than 50% 
of their time outside the board room putting these plans into practice. This finding helps us 
understand why so many policy makers (e.g Nightingale et al in the recent NESTA report) 
complain that the structure of the UK funds market being inefficient: boards are disproportionately 
concerned with fund raising, even when companies face excellent prospects. It also has 
implications for potential directors regarding their expected duties, such as “expected time 
commitment” (The Combined Code of Corporate Governance, 2008). 
Early venture board also appeared to engage in building management team’s capability 
through coaching and mentoring. As mentioned, there is intensive interaction between internal top 
management team and external directors both inside and outside the boardroom, where more 
knowledgeable directors would mentoring less experienced top management team through various 
forms such as storytelling, debating, giving feedbacks on their performance and etc. Through these 
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activities, it seems that early venture board augment the top management team’s managerial 
ability. For instance, we observe that, over a short period of time, many founders become more 
confident and competent in dealing with external affairs such as pitching investors and partners, as 
well as internal day-to-day management issues. 
Thirdly, our finding provides some evidence on alternative strategists in early stage 
ventures. The existing organization and strategy literature tends to portray founders, CEOs or the 
internal top management team (TMT) as the main strategists, taking command during the 
strategizing process. For instance, in a study of high tech startups in Silicon Valley, Hannan, 
Burton and Baron report that initial strategy tends to be strongly influenced by founders’ prior 
experience; and is costly to change. Gavetti and Rivkin show that re-designing new venture 
strategy requires a change in the internal TMT29. These studies seem to assume that founder and 
TMT have the necessary knowledge and experience required to design and refine a “good” 
strategy. However, in the context of early stage high tech ventures, original founders often lack 
such kind of experience and skills. The few existing studies on governance in entrepreneurial firms 
seem to suggest that, whilst board’s involvement in strategy tends to be limited in conventional 
small firms, US venture capital backed high-tech ventures’ board tends to have high power relative 
to management, and their involvement in both strategy formulation and evaluation tends to be 
high30. Differing from the above studies, our finding suggests that board often act as business 
model architects, initiating and developing strategy at early stage ventures. 
 
Putting the above together, our findings suggest that in these entrepreneurial “threshold” firms, 
boards and TMT can be seen as the same group; and this has some profound implications for 
future researchers. Firstly, it is not enough to study the internal top management team of the early 
stage high-technology firm, nor is it wise to ascribe everything to the founder’s conditions, as is 
some commonly discussed. Rather, in thinking about the firm, researchers need to cast their net 
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wider, and look at the boards of directors, past and present to see the complete picture of possible 
influences on the firm. This brings a new dimension to the “plural” form of entrepreneur31. 
Further, we should be cautious in applying concepts such as of “absorptive capacity” and “strategy 
making” differentially to the board and the management of the company32. Rather, the notion of 
absorptive capacity seems to be something that occurs collectively among the top management 
team alongside the board. Likewise, strategizing cannot be separated either because the board is 
highly connected with making the company’s direction. Indeed, our work suggests that outside 
shareholders would do better to choose a good board and let them add value, rather than try to 
worry about finding people to “guard their money”, as suggested by Juvenal’s concern of “Quis 
custodiet ipsos custodes?” by the words of Mathew in the Bible.  
Furthermore, our findings echo the view that we need to pay attention to board behaviour 
in gaining a better understanding of how board resolves the tension among multiple functions33.  
Our findings show how process research can complement that which studies structures. Here we 
showed that structural analysis alone could lead the researcher down the wrong path, perhaps over-
emphasising the role of the board as monitors. And it is only when the processes are unpicked is it 
transparent what is happening.  
Our findings signal some differences and similarities between the literature and work on 
“high technology firm” where ownership is also closely held and other closely held small firms 
such as the family firm studied in a different arena. In both cases as firms move through 
development stage in their life cycle, they face challenges and opportunities, e.g. task 
environment, resource needs, complexity of system and structures etc. Yet their responses are very 
different; the high-technology young firm uses the board as a mechanism to solve this problem 
where as the family firm solves this problem outside of the board room. But there are similarities 
between the two kinds of firms: the board’s controlling/monitoring role is marginal. In both cases, 
owners often assume key management positions or/and sit on board. This means that the board 
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cannot be “independent” monitors, even though in the case of high tech early venture boards they 
seem to be rather “disciplined”. Future studies may probe these similarities and differences 
further34.  
Our findings are almost certainly influenced by our context: we are examining “threshold” 
firms in a state of transition between founding and maturity where the environment is fast moving 
and complex (as in high technology), where the demands on the board is different from those in 
established corporations. Conceiving of the board as a group of monitors that has a minor role in 
supporting top management is naïve in these contexts. Rather, we suggest that, the emergent firm 
is so resource constrained that it is better to think of the board in a completely different way 
namely as the key additional resource that helps management by providing talent and effort to 
solve highly complex problems. This construct may also help boards in other contexts (such as 
organisational crisis) frame their roles and ways they can add value.  
 
Conclusions 
The early stage venturing process is a crucial period in a start-up’s life because many key features 
formed during this early stage including initial strategy and structure tend to have long lasting 
effect on firm’s subsequent quality of life. Our research seems to suggest that such “imprinting 
effect” may occur through the interaction among the “collective entrepreneurs”, i.e. the early 
venture board and the internal top management team.  And that in this process, the structure, total 
knowledge base and experience of the wider group is critical to understanding what happens to the 
young high-tech firm.    
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Appendix 1   METHODOLOGY  
 
As suggested by Eisnenhardt and Grabner (2007), our sample selection was theoretically driven: 
we followed in real time 8 high-technology companies that we thought ex-ante would see 
interesting management challenges35. During our preliminary research, we compiled a list of UK 
early stage high tech ventures through various sources including FAME database, UNICO survey 
database as well as networking events and conferences. In the end, 8 firms agreed to participate in 
our research.  
The bulk of data was collected over a 38 month period from Oct 2003 to Dec 2006. And 
follow up interviews were conducted in 2009. The 1st author followed all 8 firms over 38 month 
period (Oct 2003 to Dec 2006) intensively, including board meeting and other formal and informal 
meeting observations, repeated interview. The 1st author started by conducting semi-structured 
interviews with founders/CEOs first and asked them “who are the key individuals that have helped 
or helping you during early stage venturing process, and how do they help you?” Using a 
snowballing strategy, the 1st author then interviewed these key individuals as mentioned by 
CEO/Founders, including representatives of government funding agencies, business angels, 
University technology transfer officers (TTOs), independent advisors and professional advisors. 
Most of these individuals were part of the working board at certain points. The 1st author also 
attended many board meetings, management and client meetings at 5 of these firms. In total, she 
conducted 52 formal interviews and meeting observations, 85 hours tape-recorded.  The 1st author 
remained an “outsider” throughout this research in order to keep a neutral status. At the same time, 
the 2nd author was involved directly in one of the case companies whilst the 3rd author was 
involved directly in all these case companies at a certain point. They as “insider” add valuable 
insights to the board’s involvement in the venturing process.  
Primary data were supplemented by company confidential documents, including board 
agenda and minutes, business plan drafts, financing rounds and etc. Other secondary data includes 
information available from company websites, FAME, Perfect Filing database, including press 
release, financial accounts, IPO prospectus and etc. In particular, we collect information on each 
board member, including their CVs, past and current directorships. Furthermore, we conducted 
additional interviews with key informants between July and August 2009. 
Our data analysis was undertaken in a highly iterative manner. Broadly speaking, it 
involved two stages of analysis.  Firstly, drawing upon multiple data sources, the 1st author 
constructed a detailed account of each firm along timeline and verified the main storyline with 
each firm. The second stage of analysis involved multiple rounds of coding. Coding followed the 
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principles of grounded theory. We go back and forward between data and theory. The three 
authors not only debated about the results from each rounds of data analysis among themselves, 
but also drew upon feedback from presenting the tentative findings at workshops involving a wide 
community of practitioners and academics.  The two stage of analysis is equivalent to the 
ethnographic approach of first order and second order analysis36.   
Resolving the Tensions between Monitoring, Resourcing and Strategizing: © 2010  32 
 
Table 1 Summary of Case description 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm Sector Year of 
Incorporation
Academic 
founder 
Age by 
Dec 2006 
Company 
status as in 
Dec 2006 
No. of FT 
employee 
by Dec 
2006 
Company 
status as in 
Aug 2009 
NOVA Life science 2004 Y 3 Active 12 Active 
AOX Life science 2005 Y 2 Active 1 Active 
PHY Life science 2002 N 5 Listed in 
2006 
4 Active 
AUV Life science 1996 Y 11 Acquired in 
2005 
12 Dormant 
ID Medical device 2001 Y 6 Listed in 
2004 
9 Liquidated in 
2008 
AIR Medical device 2001 N 6 Active 6 Active 
CYTO Diagnostics 2004 Y 3 Active 1 Active 
BLUE Software 
engineering 
2005 Y 2 Active 0 Active 
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Table 2 High growth early ventures have a large “outsider” dominated working board  
Firm Size of  
working 
board  
Size of 
“informal” 
board  
Who are informal board members Size of 
working  
board in 
Dec 2006 
Size of legal 
board in  
Dec 2006 
NOVA 3--9 2--5 Previous and future board directors; VC representative; representatives 
from University; individual shareholders; key advisors and consultants 
(physician, solicitor, accountant, scientist, financial PR) 
9 8 
AOX 3--6 1--3 Previous and future directors, advisors and consultants (solicitor, 
accountant, scientists),University technology transfer representative 
6 6 
PHY 4--12 2--4 Previous and future directors, key shareholders, directors from Ltd. 
management team (in-house scientists), consultants and advisors 
(scientist, accountant, corporate financier) 
10 7 
AUV 3--7 1--2 Previous and future directors, management team (research development 
manager), consultant (accountant, scientist), director from key partners 
(Eirx). 
7 6 
ID 4--9 2--4 University technology transfer representative, advisors and consultant 
(marketing specialists, lawyer, financial PR.), directors from Ltd (its 
subsidiary)  
8 6 
AIR 3--5 1--2 Previous and future directors, representative of government funding 
agency, advisors and consultants 
5 4 
CYTO 3--7 1--3 Previous and future directors, original founding scientists, key advisors 
and consultants (solicitor, accountant, management consultant) 
7 5 
BLUE 3--6 2--4 previous and future directors, University technology transfer officer, head 
of university department (representative of institutional owner), founding 
scientists, consultant (accountant, scientist) 
6 4 
      Mean (Standard Deviation) 7.25 (1.67)  5.75 (1.39) 
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Table 3  Early venture board’s highly diversified knowledge composition  
 
Firm Board' directorship Board's primary specialist knowledge 
Total no. 
of past 
and 
current 
directors 
by 
Dec2006
Outside 
directorship 
per director 
Functional knowledge Entrepreneurial 
knowledge 
Tech. 
development 
(count) 
 
% 
Business 
development 
(count) 
 
% 
Corporate 
finance 
(count) 
 
% 
count % 
NOVA 8 19.8 3 38% 1 13% 3 38% 1 13% 
AOX 6 33.8 2 33% 1 17% 2 33% 1 17% 
PHY 9 25.6 2 22% 2 22% 2 22% 3 33% 
AUV 10 15.8 3 30% 3 30% 3 30% 1 10% 
ID 7 31.1 2 29% 3 43% 1 14% 1 14% 
AIR 4 15.5 1 25% 1 25% 1 25% 1 25% 
CYTO 7 19.9 2 29% 2 29% 2 29% 1 14% 
BLUE 4 33.3 1 25% 1 25% 1 25% 1 25% 
Mean 6.88 24.35 2.00 29% 1.75 25% 1.88 27% 1.25 19% 
S.D.  2.17 7.64 0.76 5% 0.89 9% 0.83 7% 0.71 8% 
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Table 4   Early venture board's involvement in fundraising 
 
 
  
Firm % of board’s time 
involved in 
discussing funding 
issues INSIDE 
board room  
% of board 
members 
involved in 
fundraising 
directly 
% of  board 
members' 
time (those 
involved in 
fundraising) 
involved in 
fundraising 
OUTSIDE 
board room 
Initial target 
market 
Board 
Cohesion 
Success rate 
(No. 
success/no. 
of approach) 
NOVA 50-70% 50-70% 50-70% Antifungal 
and 
antibacterial 
therapeutics 
High 30-50% 
 
AOX 50-70% 0-30% 0-30%  Stroke and 
Alzheimer's 
disease 
Low 30-50% 
 
PHY 70-100% 70-100% 70-100% Liver 
disease, 
obesity, 
Hepatitis C, 
Oncology, 
Respiratory 
infections 
and 
antibiotic 
resistance.  
Low 0-10% 
 
AUV 50-70% 70-100% 50-70% Cancer Low 0-10% 
 
ID 50-70% 50-70% 50-70% Dental 
caries 
management 
High 30-50% 
 
AIR 30-50% 30-50% 30-50% Dedicated 
airway 
device 
High 50-70% 
 
CYTO 30-50% 30-50% 50-70% MCM 
protein 
antibody 
diagnostics 
for cancer 
High 50-70% 
 
BLUE 0-30% 0-30% 0-30% Data mining 
software for 
finance 
sector 
High 50-70% 
 
Average  41-64% 38-63% 38-61%     30-42% 
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                             Table 5    Change in business model design 
 
 
 
 
 AUV NOVA,  
BLUE,  
PHY 
AOX,  
CYTO,  
AIR,  
   ID 
 
Degree of 
change in 
value 
capturing 
features 
Degree of change in 
value creation features 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
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Table 6   Early venture board's impact on business model design 
 
Firm Business model design feature--value creation Business model design feature--value capturing 
NOVA Identifying the first application; and designing the 
sequence of product pipeline within a broad target 
market, i.e. designing and developing of antifungal 
and antibacterial therapeutics with first market 
application in nail fungus treatment. 
Designing the revenue model to take its lead compound 
through Phase IIa trial before seeking an application–
specific licence agreement and strategic alliance with a 
suitable pharmaceutical partner.  
  Identify potential partners for pre-clinical and clinical 
research; as well as out licensing partners.
AOX Identify commercially-exploit these proprietary 
platform technologies and drive forward further novel 
antioxidant drug design concepts with applicability to 
a range of conditions of significant unmet medical 
need. Market focus initially in neurodegeneration and 
in particular, stroke and Alzheimer's disease.
1) Designing the revenue model to take its lead 
compound through Phase IIa trial before seeking an 
application–specific licence agreement and strategic 
alliance with a suitable pharmaceutical partner. 2) 
Identify potential partners for pre-clinical and clinical 
research; as well as out licensing partners.
PHY Identifying target market and drug candidates from 
proven Chinese botanical drug treatments which 
meets unmet medical needs in the West. And 
undertaking the purification, characterisation, clinical 
trials and formulation required to make them 
acceptable to regulatory authorities in the west. 
Designing the revenue model to take its lead compound 
through Phase IIa trial before seeking an application–
specific licence agreement and strategic alliance with a 
suitable pharmaceutical partner. 
Identified target market of their drug candidates 
includes liver disease, obesity, Hepatitis C, Oncology, 
Respiratory infections and antibiotic resistance.  
Designing R&D process to reduce the time that it takes 
to develop new drugs from 12-15 years, to 5-7 years, 
which is expected to result in significantly reduced 
development costs and an earlier financial return.
  Identify potential in-licensing and out-licensing 
partners in both China and the west. 
AUV Identify drug development candidates in cancer.  Identify initial revenue sources which mainly from 
repeated contract research. Lately, identify trade-sales 
target.  
ID Identifying and designing a sequence of application 
area based on their proprietary technology (ACIST).  
The company's first application is for the detection 
and monitoring of dental caries (tooth decay).  In the 
medium term, the company’s strategy is to develop 
additional applications for the clinical ACIST 
technology in the area of caries management, 
including 3D imaging. Longer term plans to develop 
further its clinical ACIST technology platform to 
address other applications such as lesion detection and 
imaging in oncology. 
1) Design the revenue model. i.e. commercialise the 
system through one-off sales of the Base Station and 
recurrent sales of the disposable sensors and software 
upgrades. 2) Identify potential partners for research 
development, manufacturing and distribution globally 
(from one potential global distributor to multiple 
distributors risk diversification).  
AIR Identify the commercial potential for its intellectual 
property platform, with a primary focus in dedicated 
airway devices, to other miniature imaging, infection-
control and clinical training. 
Identify the key end-user markets from early adopters 
to the late majority. Identify manufacturing partners 
(mainly local) and distribution partners, from one 
global partner to multiple distribution partners). 
CYTO Identify the commercial potential for the MCM 
protein antibody diagnostics for cancer developed at 
Cambridge U. Initially for cervical cancer, then 
bladder cancer and prostate cancer in the field of 
urology. In future, continue with its development of 
an integrated diagnostic package based on MCM 
technology but also including IP-protected engineered 
urine collection systems and a unique urine collection 
protocol. 
1) From contract research to obtain an exclusive global 
licence, with extensive patent protection, from CRT 
(Cancer Research Technology) in Urology field. 2) 
Identify research partners to commercialise its 
technology in screening for other types of cancer; as 
well as out licensing partners.  
BLUE Identify the commercial potential of the novel data 
mining technology originated from an university. The 
initial target market aims at the financial investment 
sector. Given the difficulties in dealing with large 
financial institutions, the company expand its target 
markets including bioinformatics, and other data 
analysis areas, such as textual, web data such as blogs 
and discussion threads, condition monitoring.
Designing and refining revenue model, from tailor 
made consultancy service for larger organisations to 
online data analysis service allowing SMEs and other 
individuals such as students, sole traders and etc to  
access to data analysis tools that are normally only 
accessible to large corporations due to their cost. 
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